It is disturbing to how much misunderstanding their was on both sides of the respective opponents motivations. This is simply an argument for, when you face an opponent, making as few assumptions as possible, and rarely, if ever, going beyond a narrow interpretation of facts.
I think it's an argument for knowing your perceived enemy better. That Russia at the time didn't have anyone on staff to understand the American psyche seems odd. Perhaps they did and Khrushchev simply didn't listen? I think that restricting one's self to a narrow interpretation of the facts discounts the irrational / ingenious nature of the actors, and this is where knowing your opponent and making calculated assumptions can pay off, no?
But yes, I think your original point of mass misunderstanding is spot on.
Have you ever read John Lewis Gaddis' "We Now Know"? The book is fifteen years old now, but I just read it a couple of years ago and thought it was really interesting. To your point about different perspectives - wildly different perceptions of the facts on the ground between the Soviets and Americans at that time.
Here's an old NY Times review:
http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/05/25/reviews/970525.25mcmillt.html